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Abstract  
This paper examines Thai-Japanese relations through analysis of EPA. There are two 
questions. The first involves the features of JTEPA as an EPA. By scrutinizing the features of the 
EPA, we would like to approach the institutional framework of the “new era” which will be 
brought about by JTEPA. The second question is how did the governments of Thailand and Japan 
come to conclude JTEPA? By reviewing the focal points of the negotiations, we will describe the 
background of the formation and aims of JTEPA. Finally, we conclude that JTEPA is a 
culmination of the existing Thai-Japanese relations, and was built based upon the existing 
divergence of economic institutions. At the same time it upgrades the bilateral partnership to a 
framework for multilateral cooperation by considering assistance toward Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar and Vietnam. The author would like to emphasize that JTEPA was designed based on 
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Looking Toward the “New Era” 







   When the Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Thailand for an Economic Partnership 
(abbreviated TJEP or JTEPA) was signed in April 2007, the heads of the two governments heralded 
“a new era of strategic partnership” between the two countries.  
What does this “new era” mean? The conclusion of the EPA in itself was actually an 
epoch-making event for Japan. “Economic Partnership Agreement,” usually abbreviated as EPA, is 
the official name of free trade agreements (FTAs) pursued by Japan. Until the end of the 1990s, as is 
well known, the Japanese government focused on multilateral trade liberalization and was reluctant 
to conclude FTAs. Its first EPA was concluded with Singapore (The Japan-Singapore Economic 
Partnership Agreement: JSEPA) in 1998, and was followed by EPAs with Mexico, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. Though the Japanese government continues to emphasize multilateral 
trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has also embarked on EPAs/FTAs 
as complementary tools for multilateral liberalization. In this sense, the EPAs mark a “historic shift” 
in Japanese trade policy.  
What will JTEPA bring to the Thai-Japanese relationship? One of the obvious reasons why 
                                                  
1 The author is a research fellow at Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization 
(IDE-JETRO) and a visiting research fellow at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University 
(from August 2007 to July 2009). 
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JTEPA was concluded is to expand economic interaction between two countries. As an FTA, JTEPA 
is an agreement to develop such interactions by removing unnecessary barriers to cross-border flows 
of goods, investment, services and persons. Both academic and media discussions on the choice of 
items to be included in the liberalization and the extent of the economic impact on different sectors 
attracted public attention during the negotiations.  
 The expected expansion of bilateral economic interactions, however, seems to exemplify 
merely a part of the “new era.” The joint statement appropriately declare that JTEPA was concluded 
with the aim to “take onto a higher plane our partnership for the mutual benefit of our peoples and 
lay a solid foundation for an East Asian community” (MOFA 2007).2 In addition to questions about 
the economic impact, what needs to be asked now is why Thailand and Japan needed to further 
strengthen their relationship. 
This paper looks at why Thai-Japanese relations marked this “new era” in the form of the EPA. 
This question can be broken down into two operational questions. The first involves the features of 
JTEPA as an EPA. What is an EPA? How is it different from an FTA? By scrutinizing the features of 
the EPA, we would like to approach the institutional framework of the “new era” which will be 
brought about by JTEPA. The second question is how did the governments of Thailand and Japan 
come to conclude JTEPA? By reviewing the focal points of the negotiations, we will describe the 
background of the formation and aims of JTEPA. Finally, we conclude that JTEPA is a culmination 
of the existing Thai-Japanese relations, and was built based upon the existing divergence of 
economic institutions. At the same time it upgrades the bilateral partnership to a framework for 
multilateral cooperation by considering assistance toward the so-called late-comers of ASEAN 
including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar and Vietnam (abbreviated as CLMV). The author would 
                                                  
2 “Joint Statement at The Signing of The Agreement between Japan and The Kingdom of Thailand
 for an Economic Partnership,” Tokyo, 3 April 2007 (URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pac
i/thailand/epa0704/joint.html, Last downloaded on 5 October 2005). 
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like to emphasize that JTEPA was designed based on the idea of a further integration of CLMV and 
Thailand, an original member of ASEAN.3   
 
 
What is JTEPA? Institutional feature 
 
In order to grasp the character of JTEPA, it is best to start from an examination of EPA’s its 
institutional features. An EPA is in substance an FTA as defined by Article 24 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), for example, often describes an EPA as a regional trade arrangement that goes “beyond 
WTO.” In a document released in 2002, it describes an EPA as a means of strengthening partnerships 
in areas not covered by the WTO and achieving liberalization beyond the levels attainable under the 
WTO (MOFA 2002).4 Likewise, former Foreign Minister Taro Aso described the features of an EPA 
in a speech as follows: 
FTAs are instruments which take up issues such as the lowering of tariffs during trade in goods and 
the elimination of restrictions on foreign investment during trade in services (p)remised on the 
existence of national borders. In contrast…EPAs are characterized by breadth of coverage and also 
by depth of quality, an aspect that FTAs can't even hold a candle to (MOFA [2006]5). 
                                                  
3 Whereas the author recognizes the importance of JTEPA’s economic impact, it is beyond the scope of 
the present work.  
4 “Japan’s FTA Strategy, October 2002, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” (URL: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/strategy0210.html, Last downloaded on 10 October 2007). 
5 “The Hallmarks of Economic Diplomacy for Japan, 8 March 2006, Speech by Japanese Former
 Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso at the Japan National Press Club,” URL:http://www.mofa.
go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0603.html, Last downloaded on 1 October 2007). 
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The Japanese government seems to emphasize the wide area of coverage as the characteristic that 
distinguishes an EPA from a conventional FTA.  
 
1) FTA with assistance measures 
What kinds of issues do EPAs cover? Table 1 shows the areas covered by FTAs throughout the 
world. Each item is classified according to the text of each agreement. The right column shows the 
WTO category. Since the establishment of the WTO, the domain of the GATT/WTO regime has been 
expanded. Rules on issues such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) were set up in addition 
to the “traditional” issue of trade in goods. On the other hand, regional trade arrangements today 
often cover areas that have not been regularized by the WTO regime or where there is ongoing 
debate over whether they should be controlled by the WTO. These new issues such as investments, 
competition policy, custom harmonization and environment are called “trade related matters” or 
“matters of non-trade concerns” depending on the viewpoint one adopts. The table shows that newer 
FTAs include more non-WTO issues. A noteworthy feature is the number and variety of non-WTO 
issues included in FTAs in Asia. Though there is one exception, the AFTA, Asian FTAs such as the 
JSEPA, JTEPA, JPEPA (Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an 
Economic Parnership), JMEPA (Agreement between Government of Japan and Government of 
Malaysia for an Economic Partnership) and China-ASEAN FTA (Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 
People’s Republic of China) incorporate more issues than NAFTA or the Australia-New Zealand 
CER (Agreement for Closer Economic Relations). 
   We would like to emphasize here that the non-WTO issues in FTAs can be divided into two 
groups. First, the FTAs between ASEAN members and Japan include a chapter on the provision of 
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“cooperation.” The China-ASEAN FTA also provides for cooperation, and separate memorandums 
of understanding have been exchanged for implementation by area. For example, Japanese education 
is being provided to the Philippines as part of human resource development under the JPEPA. Based 
on JTEPA, the governments agreed to carry out cooperation on financial market development, food 
safety and local-to-local linkages, for example. These cooperation projects were said to be 
introduced to enhance the effects of liberalization together with other measures on non-WTO issues. 
The most important characteristic of those measures is that they do not necessarily require any 
adjustment or reform of domestic institutions. This becomes clearer when contrasted with other 
non-WTO issues in other FTAs. For example, in the area of the environment, NAFTA obliges the 
signatories to build domestic institutions for environment conservation, while JTEPA provides for 
joint research or exchanges of specialists and technical cooperation as a part of energy cooperation.6 
In other words, cooperation measures in EPAs are carried out in the form of assistance for 
capacity-building rather than with the aim to harmonize rules between the counties.7 In other words, 
EPAs can be seen as FTAs with assistance measures (Aoki-Okabe [2005]). 
The Lome Convention can be mentioned as a precedent for a regional trade arrangement with 
assistance.8 Under the convention, the members of the European Community (now the EU) offered 
a financial assistance scheme to stabilize the income of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries. However, the Lome Convention was not an FTA in terms of its legal status in the 
WTO. In addition, the relationship between the two parties changed following the conclusion of 
                                                  
6 Implement Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the governme
nt of Japan Pursuant to the Article 12 of the Agreement between Kingdom of Thailand and Jap
an Economic Partnership, Article 45, Chapter 10 (URL: japqanhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-p
aci/thailand/epa0704/implement.pdf. Last downloaded on 10 November 2007). 
7 The assistance aspect of EPAs can be understood more clearly when they are compared with 
cooperation under the China-ASEAN FTA. Most of the projects under the China-ASEAN FTA will be 
based on the financial support by third parties such as the Asian Development Bank. In Contrast, 
cooperation under EPAs is implemented as a part of Japan’s official development assistance.  
8 Governments involved in EPAs often mention Lome and Cotonou as a reference.  
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the Cotonou Convention in 2000. The new convention tightened the conditionality for assistance 
from EU to ACP countries and abolished the preferential treatment which the former had been 
given.9 The relationship has changed into one based on the nondiscriminatory principle of the WTO. 
The shift from Lome to Cotonou is in contrast to the EPA boom in Asia.  
 
2) A Building Block for a Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership System  
   The second feature of JTEPA is that it was designed to be part of a Japan-ASEAN economic 
partnership system. The negotiations were carried in parallel with those on JPEPA and JMEPA. 
These bilateral EPA initiatives were modeled after JSEPA, which was enacted in November 2002. 
Though they are independent agreements, they share a common structure, consisting of trade 
liberalization, measures on non-WTO issues and cooperation. Moreover, those bilateral EPAs will be 
governed by the rules for implementation provided by a multilateral arrangement between Japan and 
the whole of ASEAN. Prior to the conclusion of EPAs with Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, 
Former Japanese Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi proposed the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (JACEP) in January 2002, and the governments concerned reached a 
framework agreement in October 2007. JACEP is fundamentally an agreement on modalities for 
trade liberalization and rules of origin for trade between Japan and ASEAN members (MOFA 
[2007]).10 With regard to the modalities of liberalization for trade in goods, the governments agreed 
that common concessions would be applied to all members concerned, and that they would exchange 
an offer list for tariff reduction (MOFA [2007]11). On the other hand, JACEP included an agreement 
                                                  
9 On the Cotonou Convention, see Watanabe [2003: 39] 
10 Nichi-ASEAN Hokatsu teki Keizai Renkei (AJCEP) Kyotei Osuji Goui, Heise 19 nen 8 gatsu, 
(Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan and The Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, August 2007) , (URL: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/gaiko/fta/j_asean/pdfs/ajcep0708.html. Last downloaded on 1 November, 2007). 
11 Nichi-ASEAN Hokatsu teki Keizai Renkei (AJCEP) Kyotei Osuji Goui, Heise 19 nen 8 gatsu,
 (Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan and The Assoc
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to apply “roll-up” rules of origin and to expand the range of the items upon which the tariff rates 
would be applied. In the bilateral EPAs, the governments concerned likewise agreed to “consider the 
roll-up rules of origin between Japan and ASEAN countries to be discussed in the future 
negotiation12” Thus, those bilateral EPAs make up the details of the multilateral EPA arrangement 
between Japan and ASEAN (Aoki-Okabe [2003]). 
So far we have outlined the feature of EPAs in comparison with other FTAs or regional trade 
arrangements. The major characteristics of EPA are summarized below. Firstly, an EPA can be 
considered a FTA with assistance measures, or an FTA that considers the economic disparities 
between the parties. Secondly, the EPAs make up a multilateral trade arrangement between Japan 
and ASEAN. As an EPA, JTEPA will also form part of such a multilateral framework along with 
other bilateral EPAs. 
 
 
Focal Points of the JTEPA Negotiations 
 
Let us move to the next question. How did the governments of Thailand and Japan come to 
the conclusion of JTEPA, an FTA with assistance measures and consisting of JACEP, a multilateral 
regional arrangement? What was the aim of the two governments in adding cooperation to the 
measures for trade liberalization and non-WTO issues? In order to answer this question, we will 
examine the focal points of the JTEPA negotiations.  
The official negotiations for JTEPA began in February 2004. Prior to the official negotiations, 
                                                                                                                                                  
iation of Southeast Asian Nations, August 2007) , (URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/gaiko/fta/j_asean/
pdfs/ajcep0708.html. Last downloaded on 1 November 2007). 
12 As for JTEPA, see MOFA [2003a: 7] (Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement Task Force 
Report, December 2003, (URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/thailand/joint0312.pdf) Last 
downloaded 1st March 2004) , MOFA[2003b: 9] for JMEPA and MOFA [2003c Chapter 4, Section 2, a]. 
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Preparatory Meetings (in May and July 2002), Working Group meetings (in September and 
November 2002, and in January, March, and May 2003), Task Force meetings (in July, August, and 
November 2003) were held. The focal points of the official negotiation, as summarized in the report 
by the JTEPA Task Force submitted in December 2003, are shown in the left column of Table 2. 
 
1)  Measures to enhance trade and investment  
   The JTEPA Task Force anticipated that “accomplishing high-level investment rules in JTEPA 
would be a challenge for both sides (MOFA [2003a: 22])” The discussion in the Task Force meeting 
appears to have focused on Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment for foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The Japanese side emphasized the need to improve investment conditions, and especially to 
expand the application of MFN treatment, which Thailand granted exclusively to United States firms 
under the Thai-U.S. Treaty of Amity. After three years of negotiations, they reached an agreement on 
points such as the offer of national treatment for FDI investors, protection of investors and their 
properties, and a ban on performance requirements. On the issue of MFN, the Thai government 
agreed to consider granting it to Japan in the future. 
  The major point is that Thailand recognized Japan as one of its most important investment 
partners, along with the U.S., both in name and reality. As is well known, the economic relationship 
between Thailand and Japan developed rapidly following this 1985 Plaza Accord. Though the 
relationship was impeded by the Currency Crisis in 1997, the amount of trade and direct investment 
surged through the early 2000s. In 2006, exports from Thailand to Japan reached $16.5 billion 
(making Japan its second large export partner), while Thailand’s imports from Japan reached $25.5 
billion (making Japan its largest import partner). The cumulative amount of Japanese direct 
investment to Thailand during the past twenty years reached approximately 1.76 trillion yen, 
occupying second place following China (3.60 trillion yen) (Oizumi [2007: 
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http://www.jri.co.jp/asia/2007/07tailand.html). In other words, the improvement of the investment 
environment under JTEPA was a fruit of the economic relationship developed during the past twenty 
years.    
 
2)  Liberalization and Cooperation in Sensitive Sectors 
In the negotiations, the Japanese side pressed for deregulation of the manufacturing sector. 
The points to be discussed included the elimination of tariffs on mining and the deregulation of 
investments in industrial products. On the other hand, the Thai side focused on expanding exports of 
agro-fishery products to Japan, together with the liberalization of movements of persons.  
During the negotiation process, the governments agreed to hold off decisions on some 
sensitive items, such as sugar and poultry, for further negotiations to be held within a few years.13 
Nevertheless, those items were brought up into the negotiations by the Thai side in response to 
Japan’s request to eliminate tariffs on automobiles and parts.14 After careful discussions, they 
reached a framework agreement in September 2005. The results of the negotiation are shown in the 
right column of Table 2. The governments agreed to eliminate tariffs on “substantially all” items. 
These include Thai agricultural and fishery product exports to Japan, and tariffs on industrial 
products by Thailand. Though some disputed items such as rice were checked off from the list for 
tariff elimination, the Japanese government agreed to future tariff cuts on other items such as sugar, 
starch and frozen poultry. Likewise, the main point of Thailand’s offer was a tariff reduction on 
automobiles and automobile parts.  
Thus the expected costs of the liberalization on sensitive industries, such as agriculture for 
Japan and automobiles and mining for Thailand, seemed to offset each other as a whole. However, 
                                                  
13 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 July 2004.  
14 NNA News website, 10 May 2005. (URL: http://news.goo.ne.jp/news/nna/kokusai/20050510/2005
0512thb002Ahtml. Last Downloaded on 10 May 2005). 
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the situation is a little more complex when we look at the negotiations sector by sector. The 
negotiation teams discussed cooperation in agriculture and human resource development for the steel 
industry from quite an early stage. The JTEPA Task Force reported: 
 
 “(t)he participants from the agricultural and fishery private sector of Japan…stressed that 
not only must an FTA be consistent with the WTO regulations but also various components, 
such as cooperation, should be included in the partnership” (METI [2003a: 8]15).   
     
As a result, the Thai and Japanese sides agreed to recommend setting up a joint committee consisting 
of private agricultural representatives (METI [2003a: Annex 5]). This recommendation was 
incorporated into the JTEPA agreement.16 It is noteworthy that the representatives from the Japanese 
agricultural sector repeatedly emphasized the importance of cooperation as a complementary tool for 
trade liberalization. The idea of a “balance between trade liberalization and bilateral cooperation” 
[JA Zenchu 2004: 26] has its roots in the exchange program between the Central Union of Japan 
Agricultural Cooperatives (JA Zenchu) and agricultural associations in other Asian countries (JA 
Zenchu [2004: 30]).17 They emphasize the importance of cooperation to develop distribution 
systems and marketing skills, and technical cooperation for hygiene and quality control for 
agricultural products in those countries (MOFA 2003 Annex 5, JA-Zenchu 2004).  
Meanwhile, cooperation measures in a sensitive sector can be used as a bargaining chip in 
                                                  
15 For the members of the Task Force Team, see METI [2003: Attachment 2]. 
16 Implement Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the governme
nt of Japan Pursuant to the Article 12 of the Agreement between Kingdom of Thailand and Jap
an Economic Partnership, Article 45, Chapter 10 (URL: japqanhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-p
aci/thailand/epa0704/implement.pdf. Last downloaded in 10 November 2007). 
17 JA-Zenchu, Kankoku, Thai, Filipin, Maresia, Indonesia tono Jiyu Boeki Kyotei (FTA) ni kan suru JA 
Gurupu no Kihon-teki Kangae-kata (View of JA Group about FTAs between Korea, Thailand, 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia), February 2004. According to JA Zenchu, the exchange program 
itself was started in 1999. 
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negotiations. This appears more clearly when we see a case of cooperation in an industrial sector. 
JTEPA provides for cooperation for human resource development in the steel industry. It was 
proposed in May 2005 by Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Sho’ichi Nakagawa at 
a meeting with leaders of the Thai government at the time. In exchange for the disputed tariff 
elimination on steel products by the Thai government, Japan appeared to offer cooperation measures 
to derive their concession. Likewise, the Japanese government offered the Malaysian government 
technical cooperation and human resource development for the automobile industry. Cooperation 
measures were introduced into FTA negotiations in this way. Though cooperation can be a tactical 
tool for trade negotiations in sensitive sectors, the author would like to emphasize that they are based 
on trade liberalization, unlike conventional ODA. As it were, EPA could be a chance for new style of 
cooperation, so to say, cooperation for development through further trade and investment. 
 
 
Strategies for Multilateral Cooperation Framework 
 1) Case of Japan 
The second feature of JTEPA and other EPAs is that they are designed to be part of a 
multilateral cooperation framework between Japan and ASEAN. The governments of Japan and 
Thailand pursued the bilateral FTA for multilateral cooperation based on their individual situations.  
  Since the conclusion of JSEPA, the Japanese government has actively embarked on a 
multilateral cooperation initiative with ASEAN. JACEP was proposed in January 2002, and was 
incorporated into the Five Plans for an “East Asian Community” by Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi when the heads of governments agreed on JACEP at the Japan-ASEAN Summit in October 
2003. Japan’s initiatives for a “East Asian community,” were motivated by its political and economic 
situation.  
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 In the background of Japan’s East Asian initiative is the growing influence of Chinese 
economic policy toward ASEAN. When the Chinese government proposed the China-ASEAN FTA 
in November 2001, the news astonished governments in the region. Following this proposal, China 
and Thailand announced their readiness to carry out early-harvest tariff reductions on 200 trade 
items, including agricultural products.18 China subsequently signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
 Since the launch of the “Fukuda Doctrine” in 1978, Japan had believed that it was engaged 
in a “special partnership” with China as partners, to act together and advance together. However, in 
the face of China’s new approach to ASEAN, the Japanese government could “no longer stay 
indifferent about China’s movement in the region.19” The need to rethink its “partnership” with 
ASEAN was fueled by criticism from the ASEAN side on Japan’s attitude toward its members. At 
JACEP Round Conference, held from January to April 2002, the Japanese representatives took a 
cautious stance on the liberalization of the agricultural market. The members from ASEAN reacted 
sharply to this, claiming that JACEP would have no meaning without a discussion of the reduction of 
tariffs on agricultural products (RC?JACEP?2002: 2]).20 
 JACEP and the individual bilateral EPA s were the solution put forward by the Japanese 
government to resolve this situation. In the Trade White Paper 2003, the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) proposed an “East Asian-wide Optimal Supply-System.” This 
idea forms the base for JACEP and the EPAs. This idea focused on an East Asian international 
division of labor in the field of manufacturing. The machinery industry, in particular, has promoted 
an international division of manufacturing processes among Japan and the ASEAN countries since 
                                                  
18 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 June 2003. It was done as a part of ASEAN Free Trade Area.  
19 Comment by official from Japanese MOFA, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 November 2003.  
20 Round Conference for JACEP, The Interim Report of the Round Conference for JACEP, October 2002, 
(URL: http://www.kantei.go.jp/singi/asean/kettei/021016tyuukan_h.html. Last downloaded on 5 March 
2004.  
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the 1990s. In order to optimize the system, METI proposed a system not only of lower tariffs on 
machine parts and completed products, but also that incorporated measures to harmonize customs 
procedures, investment conditions, and assistance for human resource development (METI 2003).21 
By enhancing the existing supply system in the manufacturing industry, METI planned to 
incorporate Japan into a system of close-knit economic interdependence system with ASEAN 
countries in order to prevent Japan’s isolation in the region.22  
 On the other hand, MOFA proposed using cooperation measures in the EPAs as tools for 
involving late-comer members of ASEAN, such as CLMV. In “Japanese FTA Strategy,” a document 
released in October 2002, MOFA emphasized the importance of measures to provide assistance to 
countries which were not yet ready for full-out trade liberalization. The argument was that regional 
trade liberalization would be smoothened if Japan provided assistance to developing countries 
involving cooperation for human resource development or technical assistance.  
   In summary, the main aim of Japan’s FTA/EPA policy is to embed itself in a network of deep 
economic interdependence, and to avoid political isolation in the region.23 By using JACEP and 
individual EPAs on a case-by-case basis and in a complementary way, it hopes to involve countries 
with large economic disparities together in a single network.  
 
                                                  
21 METI, “Higashi Ajia Kigyo Senryaku wo Kangaeru Kenkyu-kai” Chukan Torimatome-an (Study 
Group for Business Strategy in East Asia Interim Report Draft), September 2003, (URL: 
http://www/meti/go/jp/kohosys/press/0004463/2/030905higashiajia-h.pdf Last downloaded on 27 
February 2004). 
22 In the Trade White Paper 2003, METI touched upon the situation under which countries such as China, 
India, Austria and New Zealand were rushing to conclude RTAs with ASEAN, and stated that Japan 
would not be able to keep its markets in ASEAN and would be left out of the economic networks in the 
region. See, Tsusho Hakusho: Kaigai no Dainamizumu no Torikomi wo Tsujita Nihon keizai no Sai 
Kassei-ka (The Trade White Paper 2003: Revitalization of the Japanese Economy through the 
Introduction of Economic Dynamism Overseas), 2003. 
23 This does not mean, of course, that Japanese bureaucrats are indifferent to potential contradictions 
between EPAs and the WTO. From the inaugural stage, they were fully aware of and paid attention to 
WTO consonance with EPAs. On the inaugural stage of the Japanese FTA policy, see Ogita 2003 and 
Aoki-Okabe 2004. 
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2) The Case of Thailand 
 Thailand, for its part, also has reasons to for linking JTEPA to a multilateral framework. Or 
rather, JTEPA was important for Thailand precisely because it was based on a regional network. In 
October 2003, Thailand embarked on full-fledged tariff reductions on 200 trade items with China, as 
an early harvest measure under the China-ASEAN FTA. This was followed by a surge of agricultural 
imports from China.24 In spite of this risk of being overwhelmed by Chinese products, Thailand 
agreed to the FTA with China because it expected to be able to attract FDI from third countries. By 
enhancing its access to the Chinese market, the government aimed to lure FDI from countries 
without an FTA with China to build export production bases in Thailand. As part of this, the Thai 
government established measures to grant favorable treatment to FDI in five specific sectors 
including automobiles (in particular, compact pick-up trucks), and agro-industry (ready-to-eat foods 
and tropical products). These are the country’s main industries with international competitiveness, 
and in recent years they have faced severe competition from China. Those industries aimed to 
differentiate themselves from their Chinese competitors by specializing in niche products and by 
attracting FDI. Both the Thai government and corporations saw the FTA with Japan as a chance to 
enhance FDI inflows.25 For this purpose, the Thai government pursued both the China-ASEAN FTA 
and JTEPA in a complementary way.   
   Likewise, the Thai government and corporations have taken an active stance toward using the 
cooperation measures included in JTEPA. Cooperation programs such as investment promotion for 
the “Kitchen of the World" project, the "Steel Industry Cooperation Programme” and the 
“Automotive Human Resources Development Institute” project are expected to provide chances for 
                                                  
24 In the last quarter of 2003, imports from China soared by nearly 200% compared to the same period in 
the previous year. Ajia Doko Nempo 2004 (Yearbook of Asian Affairs), Institute of Developing 
Economies-JETRO. 
25 For Thai corporations’ business strategies over FTAs with China and Japan, see Aoki-Okabe [2005: 
398]. 
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Thailand “to achieve a prosperous and resilient economy under global competition.” Moreover, these 
cooperation measures were expected to expand, in the future, to Thailand’s neighbors.   In 
discussions on cooperation at the JTEPA Task Force meeting, the members from Thailand 
emphasized their government’s readiness to expand its technical cooperation toward Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar and Vietnam, “for more balanced and sustainable growth of this region (MOFA 2003a: 
28-19).” It is worth noting that the Thaksin administration was quite active in promoting cooperation 
with neighboring countries. Through frameworks such as the4 Ayrrawady-ChaoPhraya Mekong 
Cooperation Strategy, that administration aimed to make use of border areas as production bases for 
Thai industries.26 By coordinating technical cooperation from Japan to CLMV, the Thai government 
expected to take the regional initiative both in a political and economic sense. Thus, for Thailand, 




So far, we have outlined the features of JTEPA and the background of its creation. In Section 
1, we examined the features of JTEPA by examining EPAs as a whole. There, the author pointed out 
that cooperation measures are what distinguish EPAs from other FTAs. As an EPA, JTEPA shares 
that nature. And at the same time, JTEPA is unique precisely because it consists of a framework for 
multilateral cooperation. As a building block of JACEP, JTEPA was designed to cover the “unique” 
or “detailed” points between Japan and Thailand. Its “breadth of coverage,” especially on non-WTO 
issues, reflects the unique conditions of Japan and each ASEAN member. 
In Section 2 we looked at how EPAs were designed, taking a case of the negotiations toward 
JTEPA. Though coperation was introduced as a tactical tool for trade negotiations in sensitive 
                                                  
26 For the Thaksin government’s regional cooperation initiatives, see Aoki-Okabe [2008] (forthcoming). 
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sectors, it is important to note that the cooperation initiative arose in the field of agriculture, 
triggered by trade liberalization.  
In Section 3 the author attempted to elucidate the motivations of the two sides for pursuing 
an EPA. It was found that both Thailand and Japan used the EPA as a tool to enable them to involve 
parties with economic disparities in a single cooperation framework. By building cooperation 
measures into trade liberalization arrangements, they attempted to make it easier for economies not 
yet ready for full trade liberalization based on the non-discriminatory principle to join the regional 
economic integration process.  
   In closing, we would like to provide a glimpse of the “new era” of the Thai-Japan relationship. 
Firstly, economic interdependence via investments will deepen. However, this will be the result of 
the development of industrial production networks in the 1990s, rather than the advent of a “new 
era.” The author would like to emphasize the potential of cooperation measures to expand direct 
exchanges of people and to develop new types of cooperation among them. Though the details of 
cooperation are not yet clear, it can be a chance for those who will be affected by trade liberalization 
to express their views and resolve the problem on their own.  
  As JTEPA was enacted on 1 November 2007, its effects, especially from liberalization, will 
become increasingly concrete to people. In order to accomplish trade liberalization with assistance 
measures, or cooperation for development through trade and investment, it is important to keep our 
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